de Nigris, Francescode Nigris, Francesco2026-02-042026-02-042025-12-27de Nigris, F 2025, 'MODELOS ONTOLÓGICOS Y TEORÍA DE CONJUNTO. UNA INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA “PARADOJA DE RUSSELL”', Cauriensia, vol. 20, pp. 183-204. https://doi.org/10.17398/2340-4256.20.1831886-4945https://hdl.handle.net/10641/7791Publisher Copyright: © 2025, Universidad de Extremadura. All rights reserved.In the antinomy known as Russell's paradox, a logical contradiction emerges that had already been mantanined by sophistry in the face of the ontological discourse that has founded Western philosophy. We argue, on the basis of a study of the logic underlying Cantor's set theory, whose ontological discourse supports infinite ontic variations, that the antinomy arises if consistency and completeness, which belong to a formal logical model inspired by the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, are admitted as truth conditions. This interpretation is confirmed by a brief analysis of Russell's theory of types.22446470spahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/AntinomiesAristotleCantorKantOntologyRussellTypesArte y humanidades (miscelánea)Estudios religiososFilosofíaCiencias sociales (miscelánea)SiSijournal articleopen access10.17398/2340-4256.20.183https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105027448666https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105027448666#tab=citedBy